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Abstract: Ireland is unusual in a succession law context as despite
being a common law jurisdiction Irish succession law applies a compre-
hensive system of forced heirship for spouses under the Succession Act
1965. However, notwithstanding the strengths inherent in such a re-
gime, shortcomings have emerged. This paper considers the position of
the surviving spouse who has been disinherited, and the challenges they
face in Ireiand in the appiication of the ]egal right share towards the
appropriation of the family home. In light of the difficulties identified,
the paper proposes a new and alternative approach based on the provi-
sion of a preferential share representing a fixed monetary sum, subject
to ]imitations. The proposa] is then tested from both a theoretica] and
practica] perspective. The paper concludes that the implementation of
such a proposal, as an a]ternative to the ]egal right share, would erad-
icate one of the most striking weaknesses inherent in the current re-
gime, and should be afforded serious consideration.
Keywords: succession, Irish succession law, forced heirship, protec-
tion of surviving spouses
I. Introduction
While almost everyone wifi, at some point in their fives, come into
direct and personal contact with the legal provisions which regulate
famuy property on death, this area of law has generated relatively
nttle attention compared with other matrimonial property issues. In-
deed, despite its quantitative importance, the impact of succession
law in this area is often overlooked. As Helene S. Shapo noted in
1993:
The intellectual history of family law over the past thirty years features
vehement disagreements over the proper roles of support and property
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division at divorce. By contrast, analogous issues in succession law have
inspired surprisingly little controversy.^
In the interim, this trend has continued. However, the need to ensure
a cohesive framework of protection for the surviving spouse in Ire-
land demands that these issues be tackled.
A huge variefy of systems are appfied across the world to regulate
properfy rights on the death of a spouse, and which endeavour to
confer some protection on the surviving spouse, in particular in rela-
tion to the family home. Moreover, various common law jurisdictions
including British Columbia,^ Alberta,^ England and Wales,* Scotland,^
and New South Wales^ have recently placed their respective laws of
succession tmder the spotlight. The resultant body of discussion
papers, consultation papers and reports is a valuable resource for
those who wish to identify and analyse the main strengths and weak-
nesses of the relevant provisions of the succession law regime in
Ireland, while seeking viable methods of improving it.
In order to place the Irish law of succession into context, it is useftil
to briefiy compare it with the laws which are applied by our neigh-
bours across the Irish Sea. In England and Wales, a system of family
provision operates on testacy and on intestacy under the Inheritance
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. While surviving
spouses therefore do not possess a fixed right to a share of the estate
of the deceased spouse, they can apply for further provision from the
estate at the discretion of the court. In Scotland, in fight of its status as
a partly civil law jurisdiction, a fimited system of forced heirship ap-
plies under the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, which entitles surviv-
ing spouses to a fixed portion of the movable estate on testacy. *• What
1 H.S. Shapo, 'A Tale of Two Systems: Anglo-American Problems in the
Modernization of Inheritance Legislation' (1992-93) 60 Tennessee Law Review 707
at 710.
2 British Columbia Law Institute, Wills, estates and succession: a modern legal
framework. Report No. 45 (2006). The report subsequently resulted in the Wills,
Estates and Succession Act 2009 which, although enacted, has not yet fully
commenced.
3 Alberta Law Reform Institute, Reform of the Intestate Succession Act, Report for
Discussion No. 16 (1996); Alberta Law Reform Institute, Reform of the Intestate
Succession Act, Report No. 78 (1999).
4 Law Commission for England and Wales, Intestacy and family provision claims on
death. Report No. 331 (2011); Law Commission for England and Wales, Intestacy
and family provision claims on death: a consultation paper. Consultation Paper
No. 191 (2009).
5 Scottish Law Commission, Report on succession. Report No. 215 (2009); Scottish
Law Commission, Discussion paper on succession. Discussion Paper No. 136
(2007).
6 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Uniform succession laws: intestacy.
Report No. 116 (2007); New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Uniform
succession laws: intestacy. Issues Paper No. 26 (2005); New South Wales Law
Reform Commission, Uniform succession laws: family provision. Report No 110
(2005).
7 Recent proposals have, however, recommended considerable change to provision
on testacy in Scotland. Central to the proposed changes on testacy is that the
surviving spouse would instead be entitled on testacy to one-quarter of what he
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makes Ireland unusual in a succession law context is that, despite
being a common law jurisdiction, Irish succession law applies a com-
prehensive system of forced heirship for spouses. Thus, irrespective
of whether a wiU exists, a surviving spouse is entitled to a specified
portion of the entire estate of the deceased. On testacy, this is known
as the 'legal right share'.^ While they are entitled to some fixed provi-
sion on intestacy, where a wiU exists the children of the deceased are
fimited to applying for discretionary family provision.^
This paper considers, in particular, the position of the surviving
spouse who has been disinherited'"" and the challenges they face in
Ireland in the application of the legal right share towards the appro-
priation of the family home." To this end, the historical development
and modern relevance of these protections are first analysed, before
the overriding public policy justifications for their implementation are
discussed. Through the use of a case study, the paper then considers
the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the Irish approach to pro-
tecting the surviving spouse against disinheritance. In light of the
shortcomings which are revealed in this analysis, a new and alternat-
ive approach based on the provision of a preferential share represent-
ing a fixed monetary sum, subject to limitations, is presented. The
proposal is then tested from both a theoretical and practical per-
spective. The paper concludes that the implementation of such a pro-
posal, as an alternative to the legal right share, would eradicate one of
the most striking weaknesses inherent in the current regime.
or she would have received on intestacy. Therefore, the fixed right would operate
over the value of the entire estate and not merely be limited to movables. See
Scottish Law Commission Report, above n. 5 at Part 3.
8 S. I l l of the Succession Act 1965 governs the legal right share applicable on
testacy. See below.
9 S. 117 of the Succession Act 1965 governs applications for family provision for
children. See below. It is also worth noting that England and Wales did consider
the possibility of introducing a form of forced heirship in the 1970s; however, it
subsequently decided against such a move. For a recent discussion of succession
law in England and Wales, see R. Probert, Family Law and Succession Law in
England and Wales, 2nd edn (Kluwer Law International: Dordrecht, 2012).
10 Technically speaking, however, no one can be 'disinherited' because nobody
possesses an indefeasible right to succeed in another's estate under a wiU. None
the less, the term is frequently used to refer to someone who does not receive
anything under a will but who would have been catered for under the rules of
intestate succession had no will existed, or to refer to the feeling of disinheritance
where an individual believes the deceased had a moral duty to make provision for
him or her.
11 Although this paper assumes that the family home is owned by one or both
spouses, in the current economic climate this may not be the case for many
families. As a result, the proposal made below is also of relevance to non-home
owners.
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II. Historical Development of the Legal Right Share in
Ireland
The history of the law of succession in Ireland has, as Professor John
Wylie notes, been rather 'chequered'.''^ Although testamentary dis-
positions originally developed under Roman law, under the feudal
system of tenure which was applied in the British Isles, intestate suc-
cession prevailed. A devise of land was not possible in Ireland until
1634. Instead, landowners availed themselves of the use in order to
make a devise of properfy. With the introduction of the Statute of Uses
(Ireland) 1634, however, it was felt that this function of the use would
be adversely affected and thus the Statute of Wills (Ireland) was in-
troduced in the same year to directly facilitate testamentary
bequests.^^
Under the original Roman law of wills, testamentary freedom was
subject to the rules of legitima portio. This represented a share of the
estate which could be claimed by a disinherited spouse or child.
Despite this precedent, when wills were introduced into the English
system, this legal provision did not form part of the law. Indeed,
Minister Brian Lenihan Sr, Minister for Justice, in discussing the Suc-
cession BiU in 1965, noted 'Complete freedom of testation is a pecu-
liarly English idea which, apart from England and Wales, is only to be
found in countries forcibly brought under British rule.''''* Thus, succes-
sion law in Ireland was effectively integrated with this English ap-
proach through the introduction of section 10 of the Irish Statute of
Distributions 1695, which Brady notes 'abolished the so-called "Cus-
tom of Ireland" by which only one-third of one's properfy was dispos-
able by wiir.''^  Following this, the common law concept of freedom of
testation applied in Ireland. Testators thereafter enjoyed unfeftered
testamentary freedom to dispose of their estate as they wished, and
were not bound by any legal or statutory requirements to make provi-
sion for any individual, neither spouse nor children; the only claims
on their estate were those relating to pre-existing debts, and funeral
and testamentary expenses.
12 J.C. Wylie, Irish Land Law, 4th edn (Bloomsbury Professional: Dublin, 2010)
para. 14.02 at 885. Indeed, Sir Henry Maine noted in E. Rhys (ed.). Ancient Law
(1917) at 103: 'Few legal agencies are, in fact, the fruit of more complex historical
agencies than that by which a man's written intentions control the posthumous
disposition of his goods.' For further discussion of inheritance rights in Ireland
pre-1965, see Wylie at 919-26. For more on the ancient development of succession
law in Ireland, see C. Breathnach, 'An Exploration of Testamentary Behaviour in
Twentieth Century Ireland' (2009) 14 History of the Family 309 at 310-12.
13 See H. Delany, Equity and the Law of Trusts in Ireland, 4th edn (Thomson
Roundhall: Dublin, 2007) at 53; Wylie, above n. 12 para. 14.02 at 885.
14 Dáil debates. Second Stage (25 May 1965) Vol. 215 col. 2017.
15 J.C. Brady, Succession Law in Ireland, 2nd edn (Butterworths: Dublin, 1995)
para. 7.02 at 211.
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While the law did develop over the centuries with regard to in-
testate distribution,''^ rules limiting testamentary freedom were much
slower to emerge. However, recognizing the injustice of a strict, sep-
arate property regime, in the 1960s the Irish legislature began to
consider the incorporation of alternative legislative solutions into the
law of succession. Today, thanks chiefiy to Part IX of the Succession
Act 1965, the law in this area has changed dramatically, particularly
through the introduction of the legal right share." In the ancient
tradition of the Brehon laws, and in a similar way to the civil law
systems of continental Europe, a testator's freedom of disposition is
now tempered in Ireland. Under section 111 of the Succession Act
1965, where a testator is survived by a spouse and no children, the
surviving spouse has a right to one-half of the entire estate. Alternat-
ively, where the testator is survived by a spouse and children, the
spouse is entitled to one-third of the estate.''^ Moreover, while a test-
ator is not obliged to make provision for their children, section 117 of
16 Distribution on intestacy was subject to certain established rules. The descent of
realty was governed by the Inheritance Act 1833 (c. 1.06), while the common law
scheme of intestate succession provided for surviving spouses through the rights
of dower and curtesy. A widow was entitled to the right of dower. This provided
her with a life estate in one-third of the fee simple or fee tail estate of the
deceased, excluding any part of the estate disposed of inter vivos or by will. This
protection was given legislative status with the Dower Act 1833 (c. 105). This
legislation included a caveat, however, that dower could not be claimed by a
widow where it had been barred by the husband so declaring by deed or in his
will under the Act. It was also restricted as it only applied where the birth of issue
was possible, even if it had not yet occurred. By contrast, the right of curtesy, or,
more properly, a tenancy by the curtesy of England, entitled widowers to a life
estate in the whole of the real estate of his deceased wife which had not been
disposed of inter vivos or by will, provided that issue of the marriage capable
of inheriting the land had already been born alive. See Wylie, above n. 12
para. 4.162-4 at ,292-3. See also Brady, above n. 15 para. 8.08. Dower and curtesy
were abolished in Ireland by s. 11(2) of the Succession Act 1965.
While personalty was initially governed by the Statute of Distributions
(Ireland) 1695 (c. 6), almost two hundred years later, this protection was
supplemented with the Intestate Estates Act 1890. The 1890 Act provided that the
real and personal estate of an intestate, leaving a widow and no issue, passed to
the widow absolutely if the value did not exceed £500. Where this value was
exceeded, the widow was entitled to a first charge for £500, at 4 per cent, coupled
vnth a half-share in the remainder. This value was adjusted upwards over time
and the Intestates' Estates Act 1954 increased the widow's rights, entitling her to
£4,000, or the whole estate, if it was worth less than £4,000.
17 In the Supreme Court decision of Re Urquhart Deceased: Revenue Commissioners
V Allied Irish Bank Ltd [1974] IR 197, it was observed by Walsh J at 208 that the
Succession Act 1965 'brought a revolutionary change in the law of succession in
this State'.
18 See the Succession Act 1965, s. 115 which states that where there is a devise or a
bequest under a will, the surviving spouse may elect to take the devise or bequest,
or their legal right share. Where no election is made, the surviving spouse will
take under the wiU. A devise or bequest may also be chosen in partial satisfaction
of the legal right share. S. 115(4) sets out the duty of the personal representatives
to notify the spouse in writing of the right of election. The right is only exercisable
within six months from the receipt by the spouse of such notification, or one year
from the first taking out of representation of the deceased's estate, whichever is
the later. Where the deceased leaves nothing to the surviving spouse in his or her
will, or if there is a legacy or devise expressed to be in addition to his or her legal
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the Act aUows a child to apply to the court for 'proper provision'
where the court is of the opinion that the testator has failed in their
moral duty to make such provision for them. In fight of these meas-
ures, it has been noted, 'a considerable restraint on an individual's
testamentary freedom' now exists.^ ^
The Succession Act 1965 also introduced a new scheme of distribu-
tion on intestacy which dramaticaUy improved the situation of a sur-
viving spouse. Section 67 states that where an intestate dies leaving a
spouse and no issue, the spouse is entitled to the whole estate. On
the other hand, where an intestate dies leaving a spouse and issue, the
spouse takes two-thirds of the estate; the remaining one-third of
the estate is distributed among the issue.^ °
Finally, recognizing the importance of the family home, the legis-
lature enacted measures specificaUy directed at securing this property
for the surviving spouse. Section 56 states that, subject to certain
restrictions, where the estate of a deceased person includes a dwelUng
in which, at the time of the deceased's death, the surviving spouse was
ordinarily resident, the surviving spouse may require appropriation of
the home in, or towards, satisfaction of any gift under the wiU, legal
right share, or share on intestacy to which they were entitled.^'
III. Modern Relevance of the Legal Right Share and the
Right to Appropriate the Family Home in Ireland
The refiance which a surviving spouse wiU place on these provisions
varies depending on the way in which title to the family home is held.
right share, the legal right share will, in a similar way to a share arising on
intestacy or an interest arising under a will, vest automatically (see O'Dwyer v
Keegan (1997] 2 ILRM 401). Moreover, the protection provided by the legal right
share under s. I l l was also extended to civil partners by s. 81 of the Civil
Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010.
19 E. Storan, 'Section 117 of the Succession Act 1965: Another Means for the Courts
to Rewrite a Will?' (2006) 11(4) Conveyancing and Property Law Journal 82. In
'Reforming Inheritance Law—Providing for the Non-Marital Family' (2002) 7(3)
Conveyancing and Property Law Journal 58, Siobhan Willis notes that the changes
introduced by the Succession Act 1965 were 'radical and, at the time, highly
controversial reforms'.
20 This is, however, subject to s. 67(4), which states that where all the issue are in an
equal degree of relationship to the deceased, the distribution will be made in
equal shares among them; if they are not, it will be made per stirpes.
21 With regard to the restrictions, ss. 56(5)(b) and 56(6) provide (a) where the
dwelling forms part of a building, and an estate or interest in the whole building
forms part of the estate; (b) where the dwelling is held with agricultural land an
estate or interest in which forms part of the estate; (c) where the whole or a part
of the dwelling was, at the time of the death, used as a hotel, guest house or
boarding house; (d) where a part of the dwelling was, at the time of the death,
used for purposes other than domestic purposes, the right to appropriation shall
not be exercisable, unless the court, on application made by the personal
representatives or the surviving spouse, is satisfied that the exercise of that right
is unlikely to diminish the value of the assets of the deceased, other than the
dwelling, or to make it more difficult to dispose of them in due course of
administration and authorizes its exercise. These restrictions are not the focus of
this paper, however.
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Assuming the surviving spouse is not the sole owner, the second most
secure position for a surviving spouse arises where the family home is
held by the spouses as co-owners. In this regard, the highest level of
protection arises in the case of a joint tenancy due to the right of
survivorship, which ensures that the deceased's interest passes auto-
matically to the surviving, co-owning spouse. While there is a lack of
statistical information detailing the way in which title to the famfiy
home is held in Ireland, it is prestmied that joint tenancies represent
the most prevalent form of co-ownership.^^ Moreover, the introduc-
tion of section 30 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009
has, with the aboHtion of unilateral severance, made it more difficult
to convert a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common.^ ^
In all other circumstances, the protections afforded under the Suc-
cession Act 1965—by virtue of the legal right share, the share on
intestacy and the right to appropriate the family home—are of much
greater importance. While it may constitute a less common form of
co-ownership, a famfiy home may be held by spouses as tenants in
common. Upon the death of a tenant in common, the deceased's inter-
est in the properfy wifi fafi under the deceased's estate, to be distrib-
uted under his or her wiU, or under the rules of intestacy. Assuming
the deceased's interest is not left to the surviving, co-owning spouse,
the legal right share, or share on intestacy, may, in such circum-
stances, secure the family home for the surviving co-owner. Where
the share is insufficient, the surviving, co-owning spouse may, none
the less, combine his or her newly acquired interest with his or her
own share as a tenant in common in order to mount an arguably
stronger challenge to any application for the sale of the family home—
brought pursuant to section 31 of the Land and Conveyancing Law
Reform Act 2009 by a beneficiary who acquired a co-ownership inter-
est under the deceased's
22 Legal co-ownership between spouses by means of a joint tenancy is particularly
popular among new homeowners. From a sociological point of view, increased
levels of education, growing awareness of legal rights, and the rise of feminism
have ensured that many women who in the past would not have been co-owners
are now more likely to insist that their name appears on the title. Moreover,
purely economic practicalities have also played an important role in this change.
Where property is purchased by way of a mortgage loan, it must be purchased in
the names of all the borrowers. As a result of the enormous expense involved in
purchasing a house, mortgages raised to finance such purchases regularly require
both spouses to be borrowers, and hence co-owners, in order to generate a loan
sufficient to finance the purchase.
23 Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009. See U. Woods, 'Unilateral
Severance of Joint Tenancies—The Case for Abolition' (2007) 12(2) Conveyancing
and Property Law Journal 47, who puts forward the case in favour of abolition.
For a contrary view, see J. Mee, 'The Land and Conveyancing Law Reform BiU
2006: Observations on the Law Reform Process and a Critique of Selected
Provisions—Part II' (2006) 11(4) Conveyancing and Property Law Journal 91.
24 However, as s. 31 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009—which
now replaces the Partition Act 1868 (c. 40) and the Partition Act 1876 (c. 17)--does
not offer the court guidance as to how the jurisdiction to order a sale or partition
should be exercised, it is not possible to say, with any degree of certainty, how the
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However, while co-ownership may be the most prevalent form of
ownership nowadays, sole ownership by the deceased spouse re-
mains a possibifity. Indeed, while the prevalence of exclusive owner-
ship of the family home is undoubtedly reduced, there remains an
important, vulnerable and often forgoften segment of society for
whom legislation conferring protection in relation to the family home
remains of fundamental importance.^^ While it is admittedly rare
nowadays to have newly purchased properties vested in one spouse
only, anecdotal evidence suggests such a scenario may arise where,
upon inheritance or receipt of a gift of property, a family home is
placed in the sole name of the beneficiary.^ ^ Furthermore, a spouse
judiciary would approach such an application, and an order for sale could still be
made irrespective of the size of the share held by the surviving spouse. Formerly,
under the Partition Acts, where a co-owner entitled to less than a 50 per cent
share in the property desired a sale, the court could, at its discretion, make such
an order under s. 3 of the Partition Act 1868. Where the co-owner who requested
the sale was entitled to a 50 per cent share or more in the ownership of the
property, s. 4 of the 1868 Act stated that the court could not, in the absence of
'good reason to the contrary', refuse to award a sale of the property and a
division of the proceeds.
25 Recently, in the context of England and Wales, Professor Roger Kerridge seemed
to prove that the number of spouses who died as beneficial joint tenants was
much higher than suggested by the Department of Constitutional Affairs. On the
basis of calculations he produced, sole owners dying first constituted a mere 6 per
cent as compared with 24 per cent suggested by the 2006 Department of
Constitutional Affairs Consultation Paper entitled 'Administration of Estates—
Review of the Statutory Legacy'. See R.J. Kerridge, 'Reform of the Law of
Succession: The Need for Change, not Piecemeal Tinkering' (2007) 71
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 47.
While similar statistics would certainly be beneficial in Ireland, the absence of
such data is not fatal to the proposals made in this paper. Professor Kerridge's
proposals for intestacy, discussed below, effectively worked to reduce the
statutory legacy by the value of the right of survivorship, where present. To this
end, the calculation of such figures was a key to his argument. The proposal made
here on the other hand, is merely providing an alternative on testacy to the
current application of the legal right share and therefore would have minimal
impact in the majority of situations where the family home is held in a joint
tenancy. The proposal would generally only be relevant where the family home is
in the sole ownership of the deceased, where the family home is worth
considerably less than the preferential share, or where the spouses do not own a
family home. Moreover, the fact that the application of this proposal would be of
benefit to such a small section of society, who may find themselves in such a
vulnerable position following the death of their spouse, does not diminish the
need to ensure the adequate protection of such spouses in Ireland.
Another important measure in this respect is the Family Home Protection Act
1976. Such legislation is particularly important in the case of spouses whose
contributions are not recognized under the doctrine of the purchase money
resulting trust, most notably those providing unpaid labour in the home, see L. v
L 11992] 2 IR 77. The continued importance of such legislation is also evidenced
by the inclusion of s. 28 in the Civil Partnership Act 2010, which prevents the
unilateral disposition of the family home, essentially replicating the provisions of
the Family Home Protection Act 1976 for civil partners.
26 It may arise that, in a joint loan application, one of the proposed joint borrowers
may be taking a gift of a site from their parents. While the beneficiary of the gift
would not be liable for Capital Acquisitions Tax, any other borrower whose name
appeared in the title deeds would be. Thus, in order to avoid such liability for
other borrowers, the beneficiary of the gift may seek to have the property vested
in their name exclusively. It appears that lending institutions will usually agree to
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may have purchased or built the properfy prior to marriage and sub-
sequently failed to transfer the properfy into joint names. In any case,
the growth in co-ownership of the family home over the past number
of decades primarily protects younger generations, while many
middle-aged and older individuals, for whom succession law is of
more direct relevance, remain in traditional situations whereby the
family home is in the sole name of one spouse (usually the husband).
In these circumstances, in particular, the Succession Act 1965 remains
of paramount importance.
rV. Rationale for the Provision of the Legal Right Share
Before considering the effectiveness of the legal right share, the ques-
tion must be posed: What is the overriding social goal of section 111?
A communitarian agenda was certainly in the mind of the legislature
when formulating the legislation. Indeed, the introduction of the Suc-
cession Act 1965 was surrounded by a whirl of communitarian rhet-
oric. Minister Lenihan noted:
I am firmly of the opinion that, in the case of a spouse, the provision of a
legal right to a specific share, irrespective of dependency, is the only
system compatible with the true nature of the obligations and respons-
ibilities that bind husband and wife. Under this system, the spouse will
be entitled to a share which is just and equitable having regard to his or
her status as a member of the
On another occasion Minister Lenihan stated: 'I envisage that the
position wül be somewhat the same as in France where husband and
wife, in the absence of a pre-marriage contract, own their own prop-
erfy in common.'^ ^ However, it is submifted that the legal right share
was not enacted in furtherance of an overriding policy of commun-
itarianism, nor is it the functional equivalent of a communify properfy
regime on death. Instead, the real driving force behind these provi-
sions was a desire to protect surviving spouses against disinheritance
or insufficient provision in the wiU of the testator. The evidence for
this conclusion is overwhelming.
First, if the introduction of a partnership theory of marriage or a
desire to introduce communitarianism was the driving force behind
this on the basis that the mortgage deed is signed by the exclusive owner, and the
non-owning spouse provides their prior written consent as required under s. 3 of
the Family Home Protection Act 1976. Furthermore, in such circumstances, it is
generally the expressed intention of both parties to subsequently transfer the
property into their joint names. With regard to bank policy and the family home,
1 am sincerely grateful to Michael Kelly, Securities Policy and Training Manager,
Allied Irish Bank for his welcome assistance. Any errors are my own.
27 Dáil debates. Second Stage (14 July 1965), Vol. 59 col. 415 per Minister Lenihan.
For an overview of Minister Lenihan's justifications for interfering with freedom
of testation, see Brady, above n. 15 paras 7.02-7.04 at 211-12.
28 Dáil debates. Second Stage (2 December 1964), Vol. 213 col. 349 per Minister
Lenihan. While this may have been Minister Lenihan's vision, it never reached
fruition.
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these provisions of the Succession Act 1965, surely the legislature
would have sought to introduce a community property system which
would confer rights on spouses to family property not just on their
deaths, but equally during their lifetimes.^ ^ Instead, no further effort
to introduce communitarian legislation was forthcoming until the
failed Matrimonial Home Bill 1993, some 28 years later.2° Secondly, if
these provisions of the Succession Act were principally designed to
incorporate communitarian values into Irish matrimonial property
law, presumably the share to which the surviving spouse should be
entitled would be one-half, regardless of the existence of children, and
the property over which it should be exercisable would be limited to
family assets. Thirdly, if the goal was the introduction of a commun-
itarian property system under which recognition is given to the equal
status of both spouses, should the legal right share not vest auto-
matically instead of being subject to an election in some cases? '^'
Finally, if a policy of communitarianism was the key, should the de-
ceased spouse not also be entitled to a share in the family assets held
by the surviving spouse?
Historically, inheritance legislation was introduced as part of a pol-
icy to prevent people becoming wards of the state upon the death of
the financially stronger spouse.^ ^ It is submitted that the objective of
ensuring adequate financial support for the surviving spouse con-
tinues to be the primary goal behind such provisions today. Never-
theless, the fact that communitarian principles were implemented to a
greater or lesser degree was undoubtedly a conscious decision. In-
deed, as Lucy-Ann Buckley states, the legislation 'was clearly based
on both communitarian and constitutional principles'.^^ The commun-
itarian rhetoric was also in line with modern views of partnership and
evolving social standards. Moreover, in light of the fact that women,
on average, five longer than men and generally earn less money, if
any, the principal public policy concern was, and presumably con-
tinues to be, the financial support of surviving wives.^ * Referring to
29 In many community property jurisdictions, a community fund is formed on
marriage which operates inter vivos. Alternatively, a deferred community-of-
property regime ensures that a community of property arises on the termination
of marriage, either by death or divorce. Such an approach is adopted in Germany
and in many states of the USA.
30 While communitarian rhetoric was again relied upon with the introduction of the
Family Home Protection Act 1976, it did not give spouses an inter vivos interest in
the property, merely a right of veto.
31 See above n. 18.
32 Siobhán Willis notes, 'Inheritance law serves not only to facilitate donative
intention but also to minimise society's social welfare burdens and to alleviate
hardship.' See Willis, above n. 19 at 58.
33 L.A. Buckley, '"Proper Provision" and "Property Division": Partnership in Irish
Matrimonial Property Law in the Wake of T v T' (2004) 3 Irish Journal of Family
Law 9 at 10.
34 However, the law is placed in gender-neutral language. Moreover, this paper
focuses on the protections available to financially weaker surviving spouses,
irrespective of gender. To this end, aU proposals made are again gender neutral.
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the development of intestate protection in England for a surviving
spouse. Professor John Fleming explains:
The predominant concern for the surviving spouse has little to do with
women's liberation, but much with the importance of an independent
home for the widow, amidst housing shortage, the vanishing sense of
responsibiiity by chiidren to support their aged parents and, most im-
portant of all perhaps, the substantiaily increased life expectancy of
people over the last one hundred ^^
In a similar vein, albeit in relation to the Uniform Probate Code 1990,
Professor Ralph Brashier notes:
Despite the recent tendency of scholars to reclassify the forced share as
an acknowledgment of marriage as an economic partnership, case law
involving the forced share indicates that most courts still perceive the
predominant purpose of the share to be that of protection: the surviving
spouse should not be left impecunious if disinherited by the decedent.^ ^
FinaUy, an associated policy finked to the provision of financial sup-
port for the surviving spouse is also evident in the Succession Act
1965. This is the protection of the family home for the surviving
spouse as provided for by the inclusion of the right of appropriation
under section 56.^ '' While there are important restrictions on this right
of appropriation, which have undoubtedly weakened its effectiveness,
it none the less has the potential to be fundamentaUy important in the
protection of the surviving spouse.^^ This protection again emphasizes
the cultural importance of the family home. The home is, by its very
nature, unlike any other asset. It is a source of comfort, security and
protection. Indeed, it has been noted: 'Although the form of the family
is undergoing change, the idea of family remains fundamental. By its
association with family, the home .. . hold[s] cultural centrality.'^ ^ This
was emphasized by Lorna Fox, who pointed out that the family home
is a 'powerfuUy emotive idiom, with considerable cultural kudos and,
as such, may be regarded as carrying significant weight in poUcy
35 J.G. Fleming, 'Changing Functions of Succession Laws' (1977-78) 26(2) American
Journal of Comparative Law 233 at 236.
36 R.C. Brashier, 'Disinheritance and the Modern Family' (1994) 45(1) Case Western
Reserve Law Review 83 at 152.
37 This policy of protecting the family home is also evident in the Family Home
Protection Act 1976 and, more indirectly, in the overriding status attributed to the
equitable interest of a person in 'actual occupation' of registered land under
s. 72(l)(j) of the Registration of Title Act 1964. Moreover, s. 56(10)(b) of the
Succession Act 1965, which provides that if the value of the home exceeds the
legal right share or share on intestacy, the court may waive the payment due to
the estate in light of the hardship which meeting the shortfall would cause, again
points to financial support being the predominant force behind the legislation
rather than communitarianism.
38 For restrictions, see ss 56(5) and 56(6) of the Succession Act 1965, as outlined
above at n. 21.
39 J. Fitchen, 'When Toxic Chemicals Pollute Residential Environments: The Cultural
Meanings of Home and Home Ownership' (1989) 48 Human Organisation 313 at
315.
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debates'.*" Therefore, if the overafi aim of the legislation is to secure
financial stabifify for the surviving spouse, with a special focus on the
family home, the question arises: How well does the legal right share
actually achieve this goal?
V. Effectiveness of the Legal Right Share
On an initial analysis, the legal right share appears to function and
achieve its objective quite well. The provision of a fixed legal right is
generally accepted as an effective method of providing financial sup-
port for a surviving spouse and, it is submitted, is vastly superior to
the provision of discretionary protection as applied in many jurisdic-
tions, including England and Wales, to deal with disinheritance.*^
Based on an enforceable right to capital assets from a deceased's
estate without the need to make a court application, the scheme
adopted under section 111 of the Succession Act 1965 possesses sev-
eral key strengths. Primary among these attributes is the provision of
certainfy and predictabifify to a surviving spouse. In this regard, the
importance of predictabifify should not be underestimated. An en-
forceable right to a minimum of one-third of the estate ensures at least
some provision for a disinherited, surviving spouse who, though in
need of financial support, in the absence of such a right may be
reluctant to instigate legal proceedings to demand a share, and as a
result would receive nothing. In modest estates, which undotibtedly
require the most protection, the cost of litigation will further reduce
the share which a disinherited, surviving spouse will eventually re-
ceive.*^ Thus, in complete contrast to the discretionary approach, the
application of fixed rights minimizes litigation and promotes settle-
ment out of court. This, in turn, preserves the value of the estate,
eliminates the need for an emotionally draining and stress-inducing
court action, as wefi as minimizing the likefihood of family confiict.
Another central benefit of section 111 is that it has the virtue of
40 L. Fox, 'Creditors and the Concept of "Family Home": A Functional Analysis'
(2005) 25(2) Legal Studies 201 at 224.
41 A discretionary approach to disinheritance originated in New Zealand and has
since spread throughout the common law world. In addition to its adoption in
England and Wales, it is also applied in Australia and in many Canadian states,
including British Columbia. For an analysis of the shortcomings associated with a
system of succession based on discretionary justice, see M.A. Glendon, 'Fixed
Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law' (1986) 60
Tulane Law Review 1165; M.C. Meston, 'Succession Rights or Discretion' (1987)
Jurist Review 1.
42 Professor John Mee recently highlighted the benefit of fixed rights in relation to
the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Bill 2009
(now the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act
2010) thus: 'The essential point of a rule creating a legal right share is to obviate
the need for . . . a difficult and value-laden inquiry by determining authoritatively,
and for all cases, the minimum extent of the obligation of one civil partner to
another upon death.' See J. Mee, 'Succession and the Civil Partnership Bill 2009'
(2009) 14(4) Conveyancing and Property Law Journal 86 at 87.
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simpficity. There is no need for an enquiry into the extent of the
obfigation owed by one spouse to the other. It is set out clearly and
definitively, for aU cases, what the minimum extent of the obfigation is
on death. Nevertheless, despite the obvious strengths inherent in the
provision of a fixed legal right, important weaknesses may be ob-
served in the application of the fractional share towards the appro-
priation of the family home, and it is submifted that here there is a
clear need for reform in order to limit the potential for injustice which
currently exists.
In order to effectively demonstrate the practical implications of the
relevant provisions of the Succession Act 1965 for a surviving spouse
vis-à-vis the family home,*^ it is useful to employ a case study based on
a middle-class couple."^ In this way, the strengths and weaknesses of
the current regime become apparent and allow for a clearer picture of
the real-world appfication of the law.
Case study: The Kelly family
Mr and Mrs Kelly were married in 1987. They have four children,
ranging from 12 years to 20 years of age. Mrs Kelly, once a promising
photographer employed full-time with a local newspaper, gave up
work after the birth of her first child and has since dedicated herself
to a fife in the home. Mr Kelly has a successful career as a senior sales
assistant for a second-hand car dealership in rural Ireland. He also
inherited a small family farm of approximately 20 acres from his
father, who passed away in 1985. In 1988, Mr Kelly bought the family
home. The home is currently worth approximately €180,000 and title
to the property is held exclusively in Mr Kelly's name. Table 1 provides
a summary of Mr Kelly's assets.
Were Mr KeUy to die testate, making no provision for his wife, Mrs
KeOy has fixed property rights, which cannot be defeated by the will.
43 These provisions will apply unless the hypothetical couple had voluntarily
renounced the share to which they are entitled as a legal right in an ante-nuptial
agreement, or in writing after marriage and during the lifetime of the testator (see
s. 113 of the Succession Act 1965). However, if a renunciation was not voluntary
but rather obtained by force, fear or fraud—or if the spouse did not have the
mental capacity to appreciate the nature of a renunciation—it may be set aside by
the courts (see J.H. v W.J.H., Unreported HC 20 December 1979). Likevidse, it
could be set aside under the rules of contract if the renunciation was obtained
under duress, undue infiuence or fraud, or through lack of capacity or fairness of
the transaction.
44 The technique of using a case study has been employed very effectively in various
academic studies in the family property field. See, for example, M.A. Glendon,
'Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change' (1974)
49 Tulane Law Review 21; A. Newman, 'Incorporating the Partnership Theory of
Marriage into Elective Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform
Probate Code and the Deferred-community-property Alternative' (2000) 49 Emory
Law Journal 487; E. Cooke, A. Barlow and T. Callus, 'Community of Property: A
regime for England and Wales?' (The Nuffield Foundation, 2006), available at:
https://eric.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/15458 (accessed 25 February
2010).
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Table 1 Summary of Mr Kelly's assets
Asset • • Value
20 acres @ €10,064* €201,280
Farm equipment € 50,000
Family home €180,000
Personal savings € 20,000
Total value of estate €451,280
* According to Knight Frank Ireland, the average price for farmland in 2011
was €10,064 per acre (see Knight Frank Ireland, Farm Market: January 2012).
Thus, Mrs KeUy has a right to one-third of the estate, valued at ap-
proximately €150,000.*^ As Mr Kelly has not left anything to Mrs Keüy
in his will, the legal right share vests automatically upon Mr Kelly's
death.''^ Moreover, the legal right share is protected because it stands
next in priorify following the payment of funeral and testamentary
expenses, and the discharge of all debts owing and due—and must
be discharged before the distribution of the estate among the
beneficiaries.*''
However, a major weakness in the adoption of a fractional share is
the fact that the size of the share depends on the size of the deceased's
overaU estate. This poses a particular problem where the estate is
modest; a situation where, arguably, the need for legislative protec-
tion is most acute. Simply put: the smaller the estate, the smaller the
share. If the case study above is adjusted sfightly, this weakness of
the legal right share becomes even more apparent. Let us say that the
Kellys are a family of more modest means. Mr Kelly did not inherit
the farm. Instead, his estate consists of the family home, valued at
€180,000, and savings of €20,000. In Kght of the modest size of the
estate and the universal application of a one-third share on testacy,
Mrs KeUy is only entitled to approximately €67,000 from Mr Kelly's
estate. As the family home was in her husband's name, it is clear that
she is in a precarious position. What are her options to secure accom-
modation for the family? Pursuant to section 56 of the Succession Act
1965, even if the home were in the sole ownership of Mr KeUy and
devised to a third parfy, Mrs Kelly may seek the family home to be
appropriated in, or towards, satisfaction of her share of Mr Kelly's
estate, even where this would be prejudicial with respect to specific
devises or bequests in the will. Despite this, however, based on the
current valuations it is clear that there will be a shortfall to contend
45 See the Succession Act 1965, s. 111(2).
46 See comments of Barron J in O' Dwyer v Keegan, above n. 18. However, see also
fie Urquhart, above n. 17.
47 See the Succession Act 1965, s. 112. Moreover, the legal right share cannot be
affected, should the children make a successful application under s. 117 for
discretionary provision.
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with.*^ As the family home is worth approximately €180,000, in sce-
nario one it will be necessary for Mrs Kelly to account for the balance
of around €30,000: the difference between the value of her legal right
share and the value of the home. The situation is even graver in
scenario two. Here, Mrs Kelly has a shortfafi of around €113,000 to
contend with. In both scenarios, Mrs Kelly has three options under
the Succession Act 1965:
(i) Mrs Kelly may meet the shortfall by paying the difference of
values into the estate.*^
(ii) If the children, au of whom are under 21 years of age, are
beneficiaries under the will and Mrs Keüy is a trustee for them,
their share may be added to her legal right share in order to
appropriate the home.^ ° If no provision is made for the children
under the will, they may apply for 'proper provision' to be
made out of the estate; however, this will remain at the discre-
tion of the court under section 117. If successful, this share
could be added to Mrs KeUy's legal right share so as to reach
the value required to appropriate the home.^'
48 While neither ss 55 or 56 specify the appropriate valuation date of the assets of an
estate subject to an appropriation, the difficulty was recently resolved in the
decision of Strong v Holmes [2010] IEHC 70, where Justice Murphy held, at
para. 5.2: 'The only operative and practical date for valuation is the date of
distribution, since it is the only date on which the true nature and extent of half
the net estate of the deceased can be determined.' Murphy J also acknowledged,
at para. 5.2, the 'fiuctuating market and, in particular . . . the steep decline in
properfy values from the date of the death to the date of the proposed
appropriation.' He noted that such problems associated with fluctuating markets
did not prevail in the 1960s when the legislation was introduced.
49 See the Succession Act 1965, s. 56(9). However, considering the size of the
shortfall and Mrs Kelly's position as essentially an unpaid housewife for the past
20 years, this may not be a viable solution.
50 See the Succession Act 1965, s. 56(3), which states that the right to appropriation
may be exercised in respect of the share of any child for whom the spouse is a
trustee under s. 57.
51 While the Act is silent on the issue, Brian Spierin believes that where s. 56(3) is
invoked: The spouse will presumably . . . hold upon trust for himself and any
infants concerned as tenants in common, in proportion to their respective
contributions. The status of the spouse as a trustee for an infant beneficiary,
where the interest of the infant has been appropriated under this section, should
not be overlooked in practice.' See B.E. Spierin, The Succession Act 1965 and
Related Legislation: A Commentary, 3rd edn (Bloomsbury Professional: Dublin,
2003) 166.
By contrast, Brady argues that, 'since the main thrust of the section is to
secure the place of the surviving spouse in the family home and such infant will
invariably have succession rights to the estate of the surviving spouse, it is
unnecessary to give such infant a share in the family home at the time of its
appropriation under s. 56.' Above n. 15 para. 7.32 at 222. While it is submitted
that it is not 'invariable' that such a child wiU receive the benefit on the death of
the surviving spouse—because in the case of testacy a child does not have a right
to any provision from a parent's estate but will be compelled to apply under
s. 117—it is none the less probable that in most cases the child will receive a share
from the survivor's estate on the latter's death. However, in the case of
stepchildren, the danger of a child being excluded from sharing in the ultimate
devolution of the estate is arguably greater.
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(iii) Mrs KeUy may apply to the court to waive the payment on the
grounds of the hardship which meeting the shortfaU would
Where Mrs Kelly does not have the financial resources to pay the
shortfaU into the estate, or cannot add a share to which the children
are entitled to her own, she would therefore be forced to instigate
litigation in the hope that the court would waive the payment. How-
ever, this may not be an attractive prospect. First, in light of the lack of
reported judgments arising from such appUcations, Mrs Kelly would
not have any firm basis on which to assess the fikelihood as to the
potential success of her claim and, in the absence of such foreseeabü-
ity, she may be reluctant to litigate. Secondly, considering the high
costs which would result from the instigation of legal proceedings,
such a course of action could be perceived as quite a gamble, having
regard to her precarious financial position. While Mrs Kelly does have
a right to apply to the court to waive the payment of the shortfaU, in
seeking what is essentially further provision from the estate, she could
seriously deplete what fimited financial protection she has, were she
unsuccessful.^^ As a result, should Mrs KeUy decide not to take such a
risk, she would be forced to secure alternative accommodation, based
on either the legal right share of around €150,000 in scenario one, or
the share of only around €67,000 in scenario two. It is submitted that
the provision of such a meagre share of the deceased's estate is
unacceptable.
It should also be noted that an informal solution to this problem is
sometimes availed of by legal practitioners faced with the difficulties
arising where the legal right share is worth considerably less than the
value of the family home. In order to avoid the inordinate delays
involved in probate fitigation, deeds of family arrangement, also
known as deeds of variation, may be entered into for up to two years
after the deceased's death, and may be employed to rewrite a wiU.^ '*
Where difficulties arise regarding the appropriation of the family
home, the deed may often provide a surviving spouse with a life estate
in the property. Nevertheless, two principal weaknesses are again
inherent in this essentially 'man-made', non-legislative remedy. First,
such a deed is only a possibility where the agreement of aU the bene-
ficiaries is forthcoming. Where such agreement cannot be attained,
52 See the Succession Act 1965, s. 56(10)(b).
53 While Elliot v Stamp [2008] IESC 10 is authority for the proposition that the court
will usually award costs to an unsuccessful litigant who challenges a will,
provided there was a reasonable ground for the litigation and it was conducted
bona fide, this is again at the discretion of the court. As a result, Mrs Kelly cannot
assume she would be awarded costs as this is speculative. It is submitted, that the
less financial provision that is afforded by the legal right share, arguably, the less
likely a surviving spouse in her position would be to risk it by instigating legal
proceedings, thereby creating a vicious circle of sorts.
54 For examples of deeds of family arrangements, see Irish Conveyancing Precedents
(Bloomsbury Professional) Issue 33, Precedent J.2.4 to J.2.5.
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deeds of family arrangement may not be employed to solve the prob-
lem. Secondly, under section 18 of the Land and Conveyancing Law
Reform Act 2009, a fife estate is now converted into an equitable
interest. In light of section 21 of the Act, a conveyance of the home to
a purchaser by two trustees would overreach the fife estate—whether
or not the purchaser has notice of the equitable interest—and would
instead attach to the proceeds of sale. Thus, it is clear that the protec-
tion afforded by the life estate through such deeds is far from compre-
hensive. What the use of these deeds does prove, however, is that
issues associated with appropriation of the family home have the
potential to cause serious problems in practice and that viable solu-
tions need to be considered.^^
The answer to these difficulties, it is proposed, may He in the im-
plementation of a fioor of support for surviving spouses through
the provision of an entitlement to a fixed monetary sum from the
deceased's estate—known as a preferential share.^^ Appfied on intest-
acy, in one form or another in many common law jurisdictions,^^ it is
submitted that the appfication of the preferential share to circum-
stances where a will does in fact exist could present a suitable and
worthwhile alternative to the legal right
55 Difficulties arising due to insufficient provision on death were noted in the 2011
report in England and Wales, albeit in relation to intestate succession and
provision based on a statutory legacy: 'The Office of the Official Solicitor noted
that many problematic cases in the past were related to the low level of statutory
legacy but these increases should mean that there are fewer problems in future.'
See Law Commission for England and Wales report, above n. 4 para. 2.188 at 51.
56 However, as will be seen below, the full preferential share would not be available
in all circumstances. While it is not the focus of this paper, it is submitted that the
proposal may also be of relevance in certain intestate situations where both a
spouse and issue survive a deceased, or in cases of partial intestacy. Nevertheless,
as the current provisions on intestacy offer more protection to a non-owning
spouse than the relevant provisions on testacy, it is contended that the need for
such proposals where a will does in fact exist is more pressing at present and, as
such, is central to this paper.
57 Several jurisdictions—including British Columbia, Scotland, and England and
Wales—apply systems based on a preferential share on intestacy. It was also
applied in Ireland prior to the introduction of the Succession Act 1965 through
the Intestates' Estates Act 1954. In declining to follow such an approach based on
a fixed monetary sum plus a share of the remainder of the estate. Minister
Lenihan, the Minister for Justice, made the following two arguments: 'In the first
place, to give a wife with children a sufficient monetary sum in Irish
circumstances would, in fact, mean giving her two-thirds or more of the average
estate. Furthermore, monetary sums are not satisfactory, as they need to be
revised from time to time to take account of changing money values.' Above n. 28
at col. 332. However, it is clear from the above case study that a fractional share,
irrespective of its size, does not always provide a sufficient monetary sum for a
surviving spouse, as by its nature it is dependent on the overall value of the estate.
Moreover, the apparent inconvenience of updating the monetary sum should not
be sufficient reason to reject the importance of such a means of provision. In any
event, the difficulties, such as they are, which could arise by such a revision would
be minimized through the introduction of a detailed statutory review procedure.
See below.
58 In no jurisdiction known to the author is such a regime adopted on testacy to
provide financial protection for a surviving spouse, despite its inherent strengths.
To this extent, the proposals contained in this paper are novel.
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VI. Theoretical Difficulties with the Application of a
Preferential Share on Testacy
In assessing the suitability of such reforms which borrows from an
approach commonly adopted in the case of intestacies, it is first neces-
sary to note that there is a clear distinction between the basis upon
which provisions governing intestacy, described as 'intent-serving',
and provisions interfering on testacy, described as 'intent-defeating',
are founded. One of the primary purposes of the law of intestacy is to
produce, in effect, a default wiU, or a substitute estate plan, in order to
refiect the distributive preferences of the deceased. Presumptions are
therefore made about the deceased's intentions, as if the deceased had
completed the necessary formalities to make the testamentary dis-
positions themselves. In order to make these presumptions, the dis-
tribution patterns of those who die testate are considered. One of the
principal presumptions made is that, in general, the average testator
would want to make generous provision for their surviving spouse.^^
As a result, the legislative provisions across the common law world
refiect this belief with the rules of intestacy almost invariably placing
the surviving spouse as the primary beneficiary of an intestate estate.
However, it is not possible to make the same assumptions in adopting
the preferential share to protect the surviving spouse from express
disinheritance. Thus, while rules governing intestacy are widely ac-
cepted as necessary, interfering with the express wishes of a testator
who has taken the positive action of making a will, in order to clearly
set out his or her intentions, is a more contentious matter. For in-
stance, what if a deceased spouse had good reason to disinherit a
surviving spouse, perhaps having already made substantial alternat-
ive provision for him or her inter vivos? Although it would be possible
to introduce a system which would take such inter vivos provision into
consideration by reducing the preferential share through an extended
version of hotchpot^° or offset, this would be inconsistent with the
approach under the current legal right share which applies irrespect-
ive of any inter vivos provision.^'' It would also be unnecessary as such
a situation is likely to arise as the exception rather than the norm. At
an even more fundamental level, the question arises: Can the provi-
sion of a preferential share for a surviving spouse be justified where a
will exists? Notwithstanding the vastly different contexts, it is sub-
mitted that it can. To explain this conclusion, it is necessary to once
59 For a review of the data gathered in various jurisdictions supporting generous
provision for a surviving spouse on intestacy, see the report of the New South
Wales Law Reform Commission, above n. 6 paras. 3.27-3.33 at 37-8.
60 As canvassed by Professor Kerridge on intestacy; see above n. 25. However, even
Kerridge's proposal did not extend hotchpot to situations where provision was
made inter vivos. His proposal is discussed below.
61 It should, however, be noted that s. 116 of the Succession Act 1965 does provide
that if a testator made permanent provision for a spouse 'prior to the
commencement of the Act', this would be taken as being given in, or towards,
satisfaction of the legal right share.
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again consider the central questions arising when formulating the
appropriate legal response to the issue of disinheritance:
Does the law ... favour unfettered freedom of disposition as a necessary
or desirable incident of the economic power inherent in the ownership
of property? Or does it attach greater importance to the notion that
family property ought to be preserved within the family to serve as an
endowment to successive generations? How far is the state prepared to
interfere with property rights, whether to promote democratic or egal-
itarian ideals or simply—perhaps in self-interest— t^o impose a duty to
secure adequate provision for the support of an owner's dependants?^^
The Irish response indicates that the legislature ranks the need to
make provision for a surviving spouse higher than the predilection for
retaining complete testamentary freedom. Interference with testa-
mentary autonomy through the legal right share is justified by the
overriding social goal of protecting the financial position of a surviv-
ing spouse. It is submitted that the provision of a preferential share
designed to protect a surviving spouse vis-à-vis the family home
where a wül exists would be equally justified on this basis. This would
be more effective in facilitating the achievement of the underlying
public policy goals on which protection of a surviving spouse against
disinheritance is based, compared to the fiawed fractional-share pro-
vision currently afforded by section 111 of the Succession Act 1965.^ ^
However, it appears that while the provision of a preferential share
would, on initial analysis, be a theoretically acceptable alternative to
protect against disinheritance, additional theoretical difficulties arise
in considering the actual implementation of such a provision. A sec-
ond difficulfy associated with the proposed reform from a theoretical
perspective is that while freedom of testation is already tempered in
Ireland, the introduction of a preferential share would arguably repre-
sent a further extension of the current interference in many cases. At
its most extreme, reform based on this proposal would mean that
where an estate falls below the threshold for the preferential share,
the testator would have no power to dispose of his or her estate. This
begs the following questions: Would the introduction of a preferential
share replacing the legal right share represent too great an infraction
on testamentary autonomy? Would such a measure represent an un-
justified aftack on the rights of testators who, simply by virtue of the
62 S. Cretney, 'Reform of Intestac/ (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 77 at 77-8.
63 The adoption of a system of thirds for the division of land on death has known a
long history; see Brady, above n. 15 para. 7.02 at 211. See also Wylie, above n. 12
para. 15.03 at 919-20. As well as the system of thirds which prevailed in the
'Custom of Ireland', the preference for thirds has also recently been described as
a 'hangover' from the right of dower; see J.H. Langbein and L.W. Waggoner,
'Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share' (1987) 22 Real Property Probate & Trust
Journal 303 at 316. See also above n. 16. Thus, it is submitted that the current
choice of one-third where there are children is simply a vestige from the historical
law of succession and is not based on a real measure of what might actually be
required as a minimum level of financial protection.
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limited size of their estate, are prevented from disposing of their
property as they so wish?
Two principal arguments may be posed which can answer these
questions in the negative. While the right to freedom of testation has
generally gained acceptance over the centuries, as Minister Lenihan
noted: '[t]here is no historical or moral basis for the view that freedom
of testation is a fundamental right inherent in property.'^* As a result,
if the primary focus of the legislation is the provision of financial
support for a surviving spouse, freedom of testation should not be
considered a right, but rather a luxury to be enjoyed once the estate is
of sufficient size to meet the obfigation to protect a surviving spouse.
As will be discussed below, the implementation of a preferential share
would have the greatest effect where the estate is modest, and least
effect where the estate is larger or the family home has already been
secured through the right of survivorship. In fact, in such circum-
stances, the interference with testamentary autonomy would often be
even less than that currently applied under section 111 of the Succes-
sion Act 1965, depending on the size of the estate.^^ In addition, where
the share on intestacy, legal right share or gift under a wiU is in-
sufficient to effect the appropriation of the family home, a surviving
spouse can currently apply to the court under section 56(10)(b) of the
Succession Act 1965 to waive or reduce the balance between the
share or gift and the value of the family home, where the payment of
the outstanding money into the estate would result in hardship to the
surviving spouse. Albeit indirect, the effect of such an order on test-
acy is none the less the extension of the legal right share on the basis
of need, and as such is contrary to the otherwise fixed rights provided
for by the legislation, and represents a further infraction on the testa-
mentary autonomy of the deceased. Thus, section 56(10)(b) is a
precedent for the extended interference, on the basis of need, with the
testamentary autonomy of the deceased beyond the legal right
A final issue which must be considered from a theoretical point of
view is the impact on children.^'' Currently, children can apply for
'proper provision' to be made for them from the two-thirds of the
64 Above n. 27 at col. 410.
65 See below for the comparative application where the family home is in sole
ownership, in a joint tenancy or in a tenancy in common.
66 It is arguable that in some circumstances, such as where the family home is of
below-average value, the proposals go beyond that of need as afforded by
s. 56(10)(b). It is nevertheless contended that such an extension is warranted. See
below for further expansion of this point.
67 It is not proposed that a surviving spouse should be entitled to a greater share
where there are no children, as the main aim is to make adequate provision.
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estate which the deceased parent is free to dispose of.^ ^ This right to
proper provision would be particularly weakened in smaü estates as
there may be nothing left in excess of the preferential share from
which such provision could be made. On the other hand, it is clear
that children occupy an inferior position to a surviving spouse in the
hierarchy of beneficiaries in both testacy and intestacy, and wiO there-
fore always rank behind the surviving spouse. As John Fleming
explains:
Each generation must look after itself. Just as children can no ionger be
re]ied upon to ]ook after their widowed mother with respect and grace,
so their expectation of succession must in general be postponed to what
might be left to them after both parents have died. Children do have a
iimited ciaim to earlier attention—but only to assure their maintenance
and education during infancy and adolescence.®^
Indeed, rejecting the notion that children should be entitled to a legal
share. Minister Lenihan again reiterated the supreme position of the
surviving spouse, explaining: 'I accept that a married man should not
be compeUed to leave anything to his children where, in fact, he wants
to leave afi his property to his wife'.''° Nevertheless, the balance which
would be struck where a child appfies for provision with respect to the
proposed preferential share would be quite different to that in relation
to the current legal right share. The proposal must refiect the need to
ensure that 'proper provision' can be made for children. To this end, it
is submitted that a child should be able to bring an appfication under
section 117 of the Succession Act 1965 against a parent's estate, and
the court should be empowered to reduce the preferential share of a
surviving parent in such circumstances. However, the court should
not have the power to make an order which would reduce the prefer-
ential share below the level of the legal right share to which the
surviving spouse would, as an alternative, be entitled.
An associated, though distinct, issue is the impact of the proposal
on stepchildren. It is clear that the Oireachtas (the Irish national
parfiament) is not bfind to the increasing importance of protecting
stepchildren in this changing society. While the Succession Act 1965
focuses primarily on protecting the surviving spouse from disinherit-
ance, certain changes have been introduced in fight of remarriage and
the need to cater for mixed families. Thus, although an order under
section 117 of the Act in favour of a child may not affect any entitle-
ment of a surviving spouse where that spouse is the parent of the
appficant child,'"' in circumstances where the surviving spouse is a
68 See the Succession Act 1965, s. 117. For more on s. 117, see Spierin, above n. 51
at 312-54. Spierin notes at 339: 'The standard of provision, which the court
expects the testator to make, cleariy depends to a very large degree upon the
means of the testator.' See also Storan, above n. 19; M. Cooney, 'Succession and
Judicial Discretion in Ireland: The Section 117 Cases' (1980) 15(1) Irish Jurist 62.
69 Above n. 35 at 236.
70 Above n. 27 at col. 417.
71 See the Succession Act 1965, s. 117(3).
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Step-parent of the child, an order in favour of the child may reduce a
gift or share on intestacy to which the step-parent is entitled. How-
ever, in neither situation may an order under section 117 aftect the
legal right share to which the stirviving spouse is entitled, irrespective
of whether he or she is the parent or the step-parent of the applicant
^2
While Professor John Mee argues that a civil partner should be
treated the same as a step-parent, as regards the limits on the eftect an
appfication under section 117 of the Succession Act 1965 might have
on him or her, the legislature goes even further in the protection of
stepchildren in these circumstances. To this end, section 86 of the Civfi
Partnership and Certain Rights and Obfigations of Cohabitants Act
2010 amends section 117(3), providing:
An order under this section shall not affect the legal right of a surviving
civil partner unless the court, after consideration of all the circum-
stances, including the testator's financial circumstances and his or her
obligations to the surviving civil partner, is of the opinion that it would
be unjust not to make the order."
Considering the fimited protection afforded by the legal right share, it
is submitted that Professor Mee's apparent distaste for extended
interference on the survivor's share is understandable.'''* However,
again, in light of the difference in the mechanics of a preferential
share and the current legal right share, this proposal also considers
that special provision to ensure the continued protection of step-
children is also merited.^^
Therefore, whfie it is not claimed that a step-parent or civil partner
should be made responsible for a stepchild on testacy, it is submitted
that, as with other children, a stepchild should be able to bring an
application under section 117 of the Succession Act 1965 against a
parent's estate, and the court should be empowered to reduce the
preferential share of a step-parent or civil partner in such circum-
stances. Again, however, this reduction should not result in a prefer-
ential share which would be worth less than the provision to which
72 See Mee, above n. 42.
73 For a critical analysis of this provision, see ibid. Arguably, this provision could be
viewed as being focused more on protecting the position of the constitutional
family than on the fulsome support of the position of the stepchild.
74 While Professor Mee's comments were directed at civil partners, it is fair to
assume he would be equally reticent with regard to approving such extended
interference on other surviving classes of spouses.
75 If an estate is worth less than the preferential share, the proposals would, without
amendment, ensure that there would be no residue from which provision could be
made for a child under s. 117, and the preferential share of the step-parent would
be untouchable. Moreover, the stepchild would perhaps be less likely to receive
any future inheritance from the step-parent.
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the step-parent or civil partner would be entitled under the current
regime, based on the legal right ^^
VIL Practical Challenges Posed by the Introduction of a
Preferential Share
Once the preferential share is accepted as a viable alternative to the
current legal right share from a theoretical point of view, the proposal
must then be tested from a practical perspective. It is clear that careful
calculations would have to be made in order to fix the preferential
share at a fair level.^ ^ If the aim is to ensure, in so far as possible, that
the family home remains with the surviving spouse or, as an alternat-
ive, that a family home may be purchased, real-wortd property valu-
ations across the country must be considered based on a reliable
house price index.
In order to ascertain the level at which the preferential share should
be established, the national Residential Property Price Index (RPPI),
which was recently launched by the Central Statistics Office, must be
considered.''^ In order to obtain an approximation of the average sell-
ing prices of houses, the RPPI may be applied to the Permanent TSB/
ESRI (Economic and Social Research Institute) House Price Index,
which formerly provided figures for average house prices nationally.^ ^
From this calculation, an average selling price of €178,830 in No-
vember 2011 emerges.^" This figure is in fine with a recent report
published by Daft.ie, which showed the average asking price for
residential properties nationwide was just over €175,000 at the end of
76 Thus, the rules outlined above which govern applications under s. 117 in relation
to step-parents and civil partners would continue to exist and would represent the
minimum provision available under these proposals.
77 For considerations of the factors at play in setting a statutory legacy, see the New
South Wales Law Reform Commission report, above n. 6 paras 4.35-4.61 at 63-70.
78 The RPPI series is based on transactions which are financed by residential
mortgages, and covers both houses and apartments. It is designed to measure the
change in the average level of prices paid for residential properties sold in Ireland
since 2005. The index is also mix-adjusted to allow for the fact that different types
of property are sold in different periods. See Central Statistics Office, 'Residential
Property Price Index', available at: http://www.cso.ie (accessed 3 January 2012).
79 This House Price Index was based on the agreed sale price and calculated using
data from mortgage drawdowns. Unfortunately, the production of this index
ceased in May 2011. The 'Permanent TSB/ESBI House Price Index' is available at:
https://www.permanenttsb.ie/aboutus/housepriceindex/ (accessed 3 January
2012).
80 Taking the Permanent TSB/ESRI House Price Index for January 2005, the average
house price was €255,107. See ibid. Having adopted this figure, the RPPI for
November 2011, which was 70.1, may be applied. See above n. 78. The adjusted
selling price which emerges is €178,830. While this figure cannot be considered
exact, it none the less provides a reasonably accurate measure of selling prices in
Ireland at the time.
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2011. '^' In addition to these sources of data, planned future develop-
ments in properfy regulation under the Properfy Services (Regulation)
Act 2011 should contribute to making this task of calculation easier.^ ^
Introduced by the Covernment as a result of a recommendation by the
Auctioneering/Estate Agency Review Group, the Act provides for the
establishment of the Properfy Services Regulatory Authorify. The
Authorify will have statutory responsibilify for publishing properfy
sales prices, and introducing a new properfy database refiecting mar-
ket trends and house prices.^ ^
Nevertheless, despite the availabilify of house price indices, diffi-
culties remain and the consideration of house prices will invariably
give rise to complications. While the divergence in house prices
across Ireland has narrowed in recent years, with a more rapid fall in
prices in the Dublin region when compared to the rest of Ireland,^*
house prices in Dublin will still be higher than those in rural areas.
However, the preferential share would, if introduced, apply equally
across the board.^ ^ Despite regional variations, it is submifted that it
would still be possible to establish a preferential share that is appro-
priate in the majorify of cases, and which would better protect surviv-
ing spouses countrywide than the application of section 111 of the
Succession Act 1965 currently does.
As the focus of the protection defivered by this proposal is securing
the family home or facilitating the purchase of alternative accom-
modation for a surviving spouse, on the basis of the foregoing in-
dicators of house prices, a preferential share of €180,000 is
81 Daft.ie, The Dañ.ie House Price Report: 2011 in Review (January 2012), available
at: http://www.daft.ie/report/Daft-House-Price-Report-Q4-2011.pdf (accessed
3 January 2012). The data provided by Daft.ie is based on asking prices and rents,
and does not include selling prices.
82 Although enacted, a commencement order for the legislation is still awaited.
83 The then Minister for Justice and Law Reform, Minister Ahem, stated on 10 July
2010 that this legislation would give effect to a commitment in the renewed
Programme for Government to facilitate publication of property price data in
order to improve market transparency and early detection of market trends. See
Property Services Regulatory Authority, 'Minister Announces New Property Price
Database' (2010), available at: http://www.npsra.ie/website/npsra/npsraweb.nsf/
page/SJRS-887L8V16323110-en (accessed 15 August 2011).
84 For instance, at the end of 2011, house prices in Dublin city centre had, on
average, fallen by 61.2 per cent from their peak, while in Limerick city the fall was
41.3 per cent. See Daft report, above n. 81. It has been noted in England that 'the
statutory legacy may provide either more or less than the surviving spouse needs
to purchase the deceased's interest in the house, sometimes significantly so'; see.
Law Commission for England and Wales consultation paper, above n. 4 para. 3.10
at 40.
85 It was suggested that in Australia the statutory legacy would perhaps vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as noted in New South Wales Law Reform
Commission report, above n. 6 para. 4.50 at 68. However, it is submitted that on
an island the size of Ireland such variations would not be appropriate. Likewise,
the Law Commission for England and Wales noted in its 2011 report that there
was 'acceptance that the level of the statutory share could not be set on a regional
basis'. Above n. 4 para. 2.120 at 51.
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proposed.^^ However, in light of anecdotal evidence which suggests
that nowadays most Irish homes are in fact held in a joint tenancy, a
limitation to refiect this reality must also be included. As a result, it is
submitted that the preferential share should be offset by the value of
the share in the home held by the surviving spouse foUowing their
spouse's death.^'' It is contended that this approach would refiect a
befter balance of the policies at play and would ensure that the pro-
posal achieves the end desired without interfering with the testament-
ary autonomy of individuals beyond that which is necessary to make
adequate provision for a surviving, non-owning spouse.
Similar proposals to those put forward here have recently been
made in Scotland, as well as in England and Wales, albeit in relation
to the law on intestate provision, and have drawn very differing reac-
tions.^ Referring to the recent Scoftish Law Reform Commission re-
port in 2009, it has been noted that proposals for the reduction of the
share on intestacy by the value of the survivorship destination were
'especially welcome'.^^ Moreover, south of the border. Professor
Roger Kerridge has given his support for such a system in England
and Wales.^ ° Essentiafiy, Kerridge proposes that the statutory legacy
be reduced by a revised form of hotchpot, which would include the
value of property passing to the surviving spouse under the right of
survivorship.^^ Despite this positive endorsement, however, the Law
Commission for England and Wales was less than enthusiastic about
such proposals. In the 2011 report on intestacy and family provision, it
noted that proposals included in the 2010 consultation paper for the
86 The surviving spouse would also be entitled to simple interest, which would
accrue on the sum during the period between death and the payment of the
share. In order to ensure simplicity, the rate at which this interest would be
charged could be based, perhaps, on European Central Bank interest rates.
87 This limitation is not merely restricted to an interest acquired by the right of
survivorship in a joint tenancy; it also includes an interest held under a tenancy in
common.
88 Although the proposals of the Law Commission of England and Wales relate to
intestacy, the discussion which surrounds them is equally relevant in this context,
relating to testacy.
89 Alan Barr, 'A View from Practice' (2010) 14 Edinburgh Law Review 313 at 315. For
a discussion of 'survivorship destinations', see Scottish Law Commission report,
above n. 5 paras. 2.19-2.24. Nevertheless, the Scottish proposals are not without
difficulty. The threshold sum on intestacy is proposed to rest at £300,000 which, in
light of the primary policy objective of retaining the family home, appears
excessive. Dot Reid points out that the average value of homes in Scotland in
December 2008 was £152,256 and notes, perhaps sceptically, that the
recommended threshold sum 'therefore provides a very generous margin to
ensure acquisition of the family home'; see 'Inheritance Rights of Children' (2010)
14 Edinburgh Law Review 318 at 320.
90 Kerridge, above n. 25.
91 ibid, at 61. However, this differs from the proposal made in this paper as it merely
reduces the statutory legacy by the value of the right of survivorship, not the
entire interest held by the surviving spouse. In addition. Professor Kerridge's
proposals do not reduce the statutory legacy by any share held under a tenancy in
common. See also R. Kerridge, 'A View from England' (2010) 14 Edinburgh Law
Review 323 for a comparison between his proposals and those of the Scottish Law
Commission.
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provision of the family home up to a certain value limit—or requiring
the surviving spouse to account for a share of the family home derived
by virtue of the right of survivorship, perhaps in the context of a
larger statutory share—received 'little support'.^^ Nevertheless, while
the report cited claims by the Chancery Bar Association that such a
system would be 'unwieldy in its appfication', and by the Law Society
that it would introduce 'unwelcome complexity and discrepancies',^^ it
is contended that such views are unduly negative and overstate the
difficulties inherent in such a regime. While it is easy to over-
compficate any legislative proposal, it is submitted that such a system
would not be difficult to implement and, as such, should be afforded
serious consideration in Ireland.
FinaUy, owing to the fixed monetary nature of the provision, in
addition to the inclusion of offset, both of which could conceivably
provide substantially less to a surviving spouse than the current re-
gime under section 111 of the Succession Act 1965, it is submifted that
the proposal should act as an alternative to the legal right share,
rather than a replacement.^ "* This would preserve section 111 for those
who opt for it, while, cruciaUy, the introduction of a preferential share
would eliminate the weakness of the fractional-share system through
the inclusion of a fioor of support for those most in need. The practical
effect of this proposal may be summarized as foUows:
(i) Where the home is in the sole name of the deceased, no offset
arises and the surviving spouse is entitled to the full prefer-
ential share of €180,000.
(ii) Where the home is held in a joint tenancy, the preferential
share is offset by the value of the home. If the value of the home
is less than €180,000, the surviving spouse is entitled to the
balance.^^ Where, however, the value of the home exceeds the
preferential share, no benefit wiU accrue from the proposal and
the surviving spouse may choose instead to rely on section
111.
92 See Law Commission for England and Wales report, above n. 4 paras. 2.46-2.47.
See also Law Commission for England and Wales consultation paper, above n. 4
paras. 3.91-3.94.
93 See Law Commission for England and Wales report, above n. 4 para. 2.47.
94 The provision of different options from which the surviving spouse can choose
depending on which provides the befter protection is currently applied in
Germany. See E.D. Graue, 'German Law' in A.K.R. Kiralfry (ed.). Comparative Law
of Matrimonial Property (A.W. Sijthoff: Leiden, 1972); K.W. Ryan, An Introduction
to Civil Law (Law Book Co. of Australasia: Sydney, 1962) ch. 6; W. Müller-
Freienfels, 'Family Law and the Law of Succession in Germany' (1967) 16(2)
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 409.
95 The decision to extend these proposals to include their application to joint
tenancies instead of limiting their application to where the home was in the sole
name of the deceased was, despite the theoretical difficulties with such an
extension, a pragmatic one. It arose due to the anomaly which could otherwise
result where the value of the family home was less than 6180,000. See below for
more discussion of this point.
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(iii) Where the home is held by the spouses as tenants in common,
the preferential share is oft'set by the value of the share held by
the survivor. Where the value of the share held by the survivor
is less than the preferential share, the surviving spouse is en-
titled to the balance.^^ Where the value of the share held by the
surviving spouse exceeds the preferential share, no benefit
accrues from the proposal and the surviving spouse may again
choose instead to rely on section 111.
In circumstances where the spouses do not own a family home, it is
proposed that no deduction would arise and the fuü preferential share
would be available. The dangers of granting properfy-specific rights
are considerable and have been illustrated elsewhere in recent
times.^ ^ In particular, the 2011 report on succession in England and
Wales quoted the Norwich and Norfolk Law Sociefy, which expressed
this concern succinctly:
[R]egardless of the sentimental value that a home can have, it was not
appropriate to treat assets which were held in bricks and mortar differ-
ently to assets held in other forms, such as savings and investments. We
felt that this could cause significant unfairness in a number of cases; an
96 It is accepted that, on initial analysis, this may appear to go beyond meeting the
primary objective of the proposal, namely the protection of a surviving spouse in
relation to the family home. However, it is contended that such provision is
warranted in order to protect the surviving spouse in such situations by also
attempting to ensure that they would have sufficient funds to live after securing
their accommodation. If a surviving spouse acquires a family home of average
value, or greater than average value, where the finances of the family demand, it
would be possible for the family to sell the home, buy a house of below average
value, and thereby release cash which the family could then use to maintain
themselves. However, where the family home is of less than average value, the
possibility of releasing any liquidity from the property is a much more remote
possibility. The ability of the surviving spouse to purchase alternative
accommodation of a sufficiently low value which would allow them to retain some
cash from the original sale may be severely limited. This, it is contended, could
give rise to serious hardship and arguably jeopardize the continued survival of
the family unnecessarily, where additional resources exist in addition to the family
home, up to the value of the preferential share.
97 The importance of considering the vulnerability of non-owning couples when
making provision for the family home was considered recently in Scotland, and in
England and Wales, albeit in relation to intestacy. On intestacy, Scottish law
currently entitles a surviving spouse to a housing prior right worth up to
£300,000, as set in 2005. However, in the recent Scottish Law Commission report,
above n. 5, the Commission recommended a move away from granting property-
specific rights as, depending on the composition of the estate, the rights could be
valueless, and vulnerable members of the community could be left without
protection. While such an outcome would not occur in Ireland if the preferential
share was not extended to apply where there was no family home, owing to the
continued application of s. I l l , it is submitted that the provision of one-third of
an estate does not afford a surviving spouse adequate protection where a family
home is not owned by the couple. A similar point to that made in Scotland was
made in the 2011 report on England and Wales in relation to intestacy, which
noted: '[A]ny reform which elevated the status of real property over other assets
. . . could produce unfortunate results in some cases; for example, where a couple
sold their home and invested the proceeds to pay for residential care shortly
before one of them died.' Above n. 4 para. 2.48 at 37.
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individual beneficiary should not be better off because their spouse kept
property as opposed to stocks and
The provision of the preferential share in such circumstances would
ensure that surviving spouses would be in a position to secure the
family home, should they so desire, and that they would enjoy equal
treatment with their home-owning counterparts.^^
Another practical issue which must be considered is that in order to
keep pace with inflation and to retain real value the preferential share
must be updated. The fact that the share must be varied to keep in fine
with changes in currency values or the value of estates means that
there is the possibility of constant lobbying for change from some
members of the community. Similarly, due to the potential for public
comment or backlash following every increase, or otherwise, such a
system could be awkward for the government to implement. Indeed,
the lack of a statutory review procedure has been a major weakness in
other jurisdictions which apply the preferential share on intestacy.^™
Moreover, Stephen Cretney notes:
[I]t is not satisfactory to proceed by using delegated legislation at irregu-
lar and unpredictable intervals to vary the amount of a surviving
spouse's entitlement without any clear statement of the principle upon
which the variation is
98 See Law Commission for England and Wales report, above n. 4, para. 2.48 at
37-8. It is for this reason that Dot Reid's suggestion that on intestacy the family
home be allocated to the surviving spouse up to a specified value would not
provide sufficient protection; see above n. 89 at 321.
99 While a family's finances may not stretch to purchasing a family home,
accommodation needs must then be met in some other manner. Most commonly,
in the absence of ownership of a family home, accommodation is rented.
However, the need to pay for rent is often also a considerable drain on resources.
Thus, it is submitted, the provision of a preferential share would be merited to
ensure adequate financial protection for all surviving spouses, irrespective of
whether a family home is in fact owned.
100 In British Columbia, the former Law Reform Commission recommended that the
preferential share of $65,000 be increased to $200,000 in 1983; however, no
alteration of the share was forthcoming until 2009, when it was increased to
$300,000. The Law Commission also recommended that it be variable by
regulation; however, this was not introduced either; see Law Reform Commission
of British Columbia, Report on statutory succession rights. Report No. 70 (1983).
Under the equivalent legislation in England, the Lord Chancellor was empowered
to vary the legacy by statutory instrument in 1966. This power was first applied in
1967 and has been invoked six times since. England and Wales currently have a
lower level of £250,000 (where there are surviving children or other descendants)
and an upper level of £450,000 (where there are no surviving children or other
descendants, but the deceased left a parent or full sibling). The latest increase
came under the Family Provision Ontestate Succession) Order 2009, SI 2009/135,
for deaths on or after 1 February 2009. However, owing to the lack of an
established review procedure to guide the Lord Chancellor in when to exercise his
discretion, and to what extent the level should be varied, difficulties have also
ensued. As a result, this most recent alteration of the statutory legacy (see above)
effectively doubled the previous fioor of support. The lower level of £125,000 was
doubled and the higher level was more than doubled, rising from £200,000 to
£450,000.
101 Above n. 62 at 99.
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It is submifted that these difficulties could easily be avoided through
the inclusion of a detailed statutory review procedure.'"'^ Having re-
gard to the procedures, both currently in place and proposed in many
jurisdictions,'""^ it would be highly advantageous to state at the outset
the frequency with which such reviews would take place. It is there-
fore recommended that the preferential share should be reviewed
biennially.^ "* A statement of principle as to the basis on which a vari-
ation would be made should also be provided, namely a consideration
of a reliable house price index.^ °^ Finally, an explanation for each
change in the figure, or otherwise, should be made available to the
102 The Law Commission for England and Wales report 2011 quotes Christopher
Jarman, who observed: 'ITIhe legislation should aim for a process which is as
nearly automatic as can be achieved, so as to avoid the potential for either a
waste of time and resources on frequent consultation or criticism for failure to
consult'. See above n. 4 para. 2.121 at 52. While it may be said that the track-
record for statutory reviews is poor in Ireland, our past failure in this regard
should not be used as a stick with which to knock the merits of such a proposal.
Indeed, it is submitted, the inclusion of such provisions for statutory review would
be a positive addition to the Irish legislative regime.
103 The report of the Law Commission for England and Wales recommended a
review at least every five years; ibid. para. 2.128 at 53. By contrast, the Scottish
Law Commission report proposed reviewing the threshold sum of £300,000 on an
annual basis; see above n. 5 para. 2.16 at 16. For a summary of the report, see
D. Nichols, 'Reform of the Law of Succession: The Report in Outline' (2010) 14(2)
Edinburgh Law Review 306.
104 Akin to proposals on intestacy in England and Wales, it is possible that a review
of the preferential share could be prescribed to take place 'no less than once every
two years' to allow the fiexibility to respond to changes in property values, if
required. However, it is submitted that it is unlikely that such a shorter time frame
would, in practice, be required.
105 In the consultation paper for England and Wales, it was suggested that the
statutory legacy might be raised in line with the average rate of increase, if any, of
house prices across England and Wales. However, in the 2011 report, above n. 4
para. 2.123 at 52, the Law Commission for England and Wales explains that it had
been convinced that the statutory legacy should not be linked exclusively to house
price inflation. Instead, it proposed a 'statutory indexation mechanism'. The level
of statutory legacy would be updated periodically by reference to the retail prices
index (RPl). The RPI is published on a monthly basis by the Office for National
Statistics and includes certain housing costs (council tax, mortgage interest
repayments, house depreciation, buildings insurance, ground rent, and estate
agents' and conveyancing fees) not included in the consumer prices index (CPI).
As a result, the Commission explained, in para. 2.124 at 52-3: 'Using RPI means
that future increases in the statutory legacy will reflect house price inflation to
some extent but also reflect inflation in the rest of the economy and across the
country as a whole.' The report continues. In para. 2.127 at 53, by stating that the
Lord Chancellor would, however, be given discretion to substitute a different
measure of inflation In place of the RPI, if required, in order to 'give sufficient
flexibility to choose a measure of inflation that is considered to be most
appropriate or to cater for the possibility that the RPI is no longer published'. This
approach certainly appears to be more attractive than a mere consideration of
changes in house prices and, it is submitted, would be an appropriate basis on
which to make a variation of the preferential share. Unfortunately, however, while
in Ireland the Central Statistics Office does publish a CPI—which covers a range
of housing costs including mortgage interest repayments, private and public
rental costs, home insurance and local authority service charges—it does not
include home depreciation values. It is submitted that this is a serious weakness in
the index as it currently exists, and should be eliminated before being invoked for
the purpose of reviewing the preferential share.
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pubfic upon the completion of each review. ^ "^  Moreover, any amend-
ment to the preferential share should be rounded to the nearest
€1,000.
It would be remiss not to comment on two further issues which
must be considered in implementing any such proposal: first, the
constitutional implications, if any, which could arise with the intro-
duction of a preferential share; secondly, the appropriateness, or
otherwise, of adopting a preferential share in the midst of a property
crisis. In response to the former issue, it is submifted that despite the
comprehensive nature of the measure and the considerable impact it
would have where the family home is in the sole name of the deceased
spouse, the implementation of a preferential share would not be re-
pugnant to Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Irish constitution). Unlike the
Matrimonial Home Bill 1993, which sought to introduce an automatic
beneficial joint tenancy of the family home inter vivos and was subse-
quently found to be unconstitutional,^"'' the preferential share would
have no effect inter vivos and would fundamentally be based on the
existing interference in the property matters of spouses on death, as
currently applied under sections 111 and 56(10) of the Succession Act
1965. As the current interference is constitutionaüy acceptable, this
proposal would also be acceptable. With regard to the lafter issue,
concerning the introduction of a preferential share during a period of
crisis in the property market, it is submitted that rather than being the
worst possible time for such reform, the correction of the market
which is currently taking place actuaUy presents the perfect opportun-
ity for such reform to fiourish. In light of the dramatic falls in house
prices since 2007, prices now, arguably, refiect more accurately the
true value of property in Ireland. Moreover, having learned from the
mistakes of the past, it is widely considered that the government will
focus on ensuring stability in the property market in the coming
years.^ °^ In such an environment, it is submitted that the conditions
are ripe for the implementation of a preferential share in order to cure
106 Law Commission for England and Wales report, ibid. para. 2.126 at 53, proposes
that index-linked updates of the statutory share on intestacy are intended to be
'upwards-only'. No such recommendation is made in these proposals.
107 In the matter of Article 26 of the Constitution & in the matter of the Matrimonial
Home Bill, 1993 [1994] 1ILRM 241. The retrospective effect of the provision and
its infringement on the constitutionally protected authority of the family were the
principal factors in the finding of unconstitutionality.
108 As Ronan Lyons points out: 'It is somewhat ingrained in Irish commentary to see
larger falls as a bad thing . . . However, if you think of the fall in house prices as a
necessary correction, whose size is determined by fundamental factors, then it is
better for the prices to race to the finishing line than to crawl there.' See Daft
Report, above n. 81 at 2. Lyons also explains that attaining stability in the market,
instead of rising prices, is the key to success: 'The golden rule of house prices is
that over the long run, they don't increase any faster than infiation. We can see
this everywhere: in Ireland up to 1995, in the US over the last fifty years or in the
Netherlands over the last four hundred years. So, if we're seeing house prices
rising any faster than about 2 per cent a year, as we did during our bubble,
something has gone wrong. What the market needs is stable prices, not rising
ones.' Above n. 81 at 3.
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one of the most serious defects in the Succession Act as it currently
stands: specificaUy, the lack of a fioor of support for those most in
need.
VIII. Application of the Proposal
Using the hypothetical scenario outfined in the case study above, the
impfications of the introduction of a preferential share become
clearer, and the difference between the proposal made here and the
law as currently appfied under section 111 of the Succession Act 1965
becomes apparent.
Table 2 shows that the effect of the proposal is considerable when
appfied to a home in the sole ownership of the deceased spouse. In the
larger estate in scenario one, the share which a surviving spouse takes
is increased by approximately €30,000 (about 7 per cent of the estate).
By contrast, in relation to the smaUer estate in scenario two, the share
rises by approximately €113,000 (about 57 per cent of the estate). This
means that while under the current law, in the absence of an order
under section 56(10) of the Succession Act 1965, the legal right share
is the equivalent of 33 per cent of the estate, with the introduction of a
preferential share, the percentage share of the estate designated for
the financial protection of a surviving spouse would vary consider-
ably. In relation to the larger estate in scenario one, the preferential
share amounts to approximately 40 per cent of the entire estate. How-
ever, with the smaUer estate in scenario two, the preferential share
amounts to 90 per cent.
Table 2 Comparative application of current law and proposal on
testacy: Sole ownership
Scenario One: Estate Scenario Two: Estate
valued at €451,280 (inc. valued at €200,000 (inc.
home worth €180,000) home worth €180,000)
Section 111 (1/3 estate) €150,426 (83.57% of €66,666 (37.03% of
home) home)
Preferential share €180,000 (100% of €180,000 (100% of
(€180,000) home) home)
By contrast. Table 3 demonstrates that the effect of the proposal is
minimal, where the home is of average value and is held by both
spouses as joint tenants.^°^ Owing to the lack of provision resulting
from the application of the preferential share, in such circumstances,
109 As the family home passes to the surviving spouse due to the right of
survivorship, it does not constitute part of the deceased's estate. Thus, the figures
are adjusted to refiect the actual value of the estate without the family home.
However, the value of the home is relevant for the purposes of the proposals
made based on the preferential share, owing to the inclusion of set-off.
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Table 3 Comparative application of current law and proposal: Joint
tenancy I
Scenario One: Estate Scenario Two: Estate
valued at €271,280 valued at €20,000
(excl. family home (excl. family home
worth €180,000) worth €180,000)
Section 111 (1/3 estate) Home + €90,426 Home + €6,666
Preferential share Home Home
(€180,000)
and where the home is worth more than average, surviving spouses
would instead be advised to avail themselves of the legal right share
provided by section 111 of the Succession Act 1965, which would
ensure much greater provision.
However, the introduction of a preferential share could stiU be rele-
vant in a joint tenancy where the family home is worth less than
€180,000. In such circumstances, this proposal once again gains im-
portance, and may protect a surviving joint tenant better than the
current legal right share. By adjusting the case study once more, this
effect can be clearly seen in Table 4 (where the family home is held in a
joint tenancy and is worth €160,000, and the deceased spouse also
possesses savings worth €20,000). While the focus of the protection
afforded by the preferential share is undoubtedly directed towards
surviving, non-owning spouses, it is submitted that the extension of
the proposal to situations where a joint tenancy arises is a pragmatic
one, as evidenced in this application. The possible anomaly is avoided
where, in such a scenario, a surviving, non-owning spouse would
receive both the home and the €20,000 savings, while a surviving joint
tenant would be fimited to receiving the family home under the right
of survivorship and the legal right share of approximately €7,000.
Table 4 Comparative application of current law and proposal: Joint
tenancy II
Estate valued at €20,000 (excl. family home
worth €160,000)
Section 111 (1/3 estate) Home + €6,666
Preferential share (€180,000) Home + €20,000
Illustrating the comparative effects of the proposal for a surviving
tenant in common is more difficult as the share of the home held
under a tenancy in common can vary considerably. However, at both
ends of the spectrum of a tenancy in common, finks can be drawn
with the impact of the proposals on non-ovi/ning spouses and spouses
gaining an interest under a joint tenancy, respectively. To this end, it is
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Table 5 Comparative application of current law and proposal: Tenancy
in common I
Scenario One: Estate Scenario Two: Estate
valued at €361,280 (excl. valued at €110,000 (excl.
50% interest in family 50% interest in family
home worth €90,000) home worth €90,000)
Section 111 (1/3 50% of home + €120,426 50% of home + €36,666
estate) (100% of home -i- €30,426) (70.37% of home)
Preferential share 50% of home + €90,000 50% of home -i- €90,000
(€180,000) (100% of home) (100% of home)
clear that where a small share in the home is held by the surviving
tenant in common, the situation arising under these proposals would
be akin to that of sole ownership as the preferential share would
merely be reduced by the fimited interest held in the home. On the
other hand, where a large share of the home, perhaps approaching
full ownership, is held by the surviving co-owner, the outcome would
more closely resemble a joint tenancy and the benefit, if any, pre-
sented by the proposal would be limited to situations where the home
was worth less than the preferential share. However, in order to
understand the impact of the proposal on a tenancy in common where
the ownership is equally divided, it is useful to consider Table 5. It is
clear that while in the larger estate in scenario one it would be more
beneficial to a surviving tenant in common to avail themselves of the
one-third share currently afforded by section 111 of the Succession
Act 1965, the merits of this proposal, once again, come to the fore
in the smaUer estate in scenario two, where the preferential share
affords vastly more protection to the surviving tenant in common than
does the legal right share.
Finally, as in a joint tenancy, the advantages of the current proposal
where the home is worth less than average are equally relevant with
regard to a tenancy in common. This is demonstrated in Table 6. A
similar anomaly whereby a surviving spouse with no interest in the
family home would be in a more advantageous situation than a co-
owning, surviving spouse who was a tenant in common is avoided by
extending the preferential share to situations where the family home
is co-owned.
Table 6 Comparative application of current law and proposal: Tenancy
in common II
Estate valued at €100,000 (excl. 50% interest
in family home worth €80,000)
Section 111 (1/3 estate) 50% of home + €33,333 (70.83% of home)
Preferential share (€180,000) 50% of home -t- €100,000 (100% of home +
€20,000)
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It is submifted that where the means of the testator are limited to
less than €180,000 when the family home is included, it is not ex-
cessive to ring-fence such a figure for the financial protection of the
surviving spouse, whether the home is in the sole ownership of the
deceased or is co-owned either through a joint tenancy or a tenancy
in common.""
IX. Conclusion
There is a phrase in Irish 'Tus maith, ¡eath na h-oibre', or 'A good start
is half the work'. The provisions of the Succession Act 1965 confer-
ring fixed rights on the surviving spouse certainly represent a 'good
start'. The Oireachtas succeeded in providing a sofid framework of
protection for the stirviving spouse and the family home with the legal
right share and the right to appropriation. These protections should
not be underestimated and the legislature should be lauded for its
courage in enacting such a regime in the face of the then widespread
application of discretionary provision on testacy. The dual effect of
these rights is far superior to the protection provided in many other
common law jurisdictions on death, including England and Wales,
and represents a key aftribute of Irish matrimonial properfy law.
Nevertheless, despite the clear strengths of the Succession Act
1965, this paper has demonstrated a key weakness in the adoption of a
fractional share as a protection against disinheritance under section
111 of the Act. Consequently, while there is a high degree of famüiar-
ify with the current legislative provisions which will weigh in favour
of retaining the status quo, it is concluded that the implementation of
a preferential share to protect surviving spouses from disinheritance,
as an alternative to the legal right share, should be seriously con-
sidered. While it is accepted that an alteration of the law to provide
for a preferential share from a testate estate could be viewed in some
quarters as an infraction too far on testamentary freedom, it is none
the less argued that this proposal would not present any greater inter-
ference in the testamentary autonomy of the testator than does the
law as it currently stands in the majorify of cases. Neither, it is con-
cluded, would it be repugnant to the core features of the current
regime against disinheritance under Irish law or introduce radically
different principles. What this novel approach would do, however, is
to further develop and restructure the important fixed rights already
afforded by the Succession Act 1965. Providing some of the most
vtilnerable members of sociefy—specificaUy, surviving, non-owning
spouses—with the right to a fixed monetary sum, irrespective of the
size of the estate, would radically enhance their protection against
disinheritance and place them in a much stronger position vis-à-vis
the family home on death.
110 See above n. 96.
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While the commitment to testamentary freedom was seriously chal-
lenged in 1965 with the introduction of the legal right share, now,
nearly 50 years later, very few would argue that the measure should
be rowed back on. Instead, it is submifted, improvements could be
made. As the need to provide protection for a surviving spouse is the
principal driving force behind the provision of the legal right share,
where this does not fulfil the objective, namely in modest estates, re-
evaluation of the modus operandi needs to take place. To this end,
reform on the basis of a preferential share must be afforded serious
consideration in Ireland.
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